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Abstract 
This article analyses the concept of the doctrine of adverse possession by comparing the legal 
position of the estate owner and the adverse possessor in three legal systems, England and 
Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, with a view to identifying which jurisdiction offers 
more protection to each party. It explores the theoretical underpinnings of adverse possession 
in the context of the shifting priorities of land law more generally. 
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Introduction 
‘Fondness of adverse possession should not preclude examination of whether it may operate 
unfairly in certain circumstances.’’2 
The doctrine of adverse possession offers a mere trespasser the opportunity to acquire a 
better title to land than the person who ‘legally’ owns it, through sustained actual possession, 
as well as the requisite intention to possess the land. The doctrine can be traced to the Roman 
doctrine of usucapio, which is the acquisition of ownership by possession for a certain period.3 
Modern adverse possession is rooted in feudal land law, the 1066 reforms of William the 
                                                          
1 Victoria graduated with a first class LLB Hons degree in Law and is currently undertaking a Masters 
in Criminology at Plymouth University 
2 Woods, U., ‘The position of the owner under the Irish law on adverse possession’, (2008), Dublin 
University Law Journal, vol.30, p.319. 
3 Benton, L., Straumann, B., ‘Acquiring Empire by Land: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern 
European Practice’, (2010), Law and History Review, vol.28, p.15. 
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Conqueror, and the concept of the feudal system of land ownership.4 The increasing pressure5 
to reform the law on adverse possession led to the introduction of the Land Registration Act 
2002, which limited the scope of the doctrine for registered land in England and Wales. This 
was the response to growing concerns that the doctrine operates unfairly,6 a notion which has 
been addressed partially, but which still affects unregistered land. This comparative piece 
seeks to establish what the position of the estate owner and the adverse possessor is in each 
of the three systems and which jurisdiction offers more protection to each party. This is 
supported by an analysis of the main similarities and differences between the legal systems, 
as well as critique of the doctrinal rules. The theoretical underpinnings of adverse possession 
are also investigated to gain a better understanding of the doctrine, and whether or not these 
arguments are still satisfactory, given their feudal period origins. Consequently, this work 
seeks to explore which of the three systems is the most adequate at the moment, whilst 
bearing in mind the shifting priorities of land law. 
 
1 Theories and Arguments Supporting Adverse Possession 
Following the highly publicised decision in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham7, the doctrine of 
adverse possession has been widely criticised, not least by the judges. At first instance, 
Neuberger J labelled adverse possession as ‘draconian to the owner and a windfall to the 
squatter’8, and in the Supreme Court, Lord Bingham observed that adverse possession is 
‘apparently unjust’.9 To some, the doctrine is a ‘form of control which is no longer socially 
approved’,10 highlighting that it has become too easy for adverse possessors to acquire land. 
The Land Registration Act 2002 was introduced as a response to this growing consensus. It 
effectively prevents the adverse possession of registered land, something which attracted little 
critical attention, although Martin Dixon clearly stated that there is ‘nothing inherently 
contradictory in having principles of adverse possession in registered land.’11 The doctrine has 
been unaffected in unregistered land, so the historical concepts behind its validity remain 
unchanged and explain what considerations hold it together. 
 
                                                          
4 All land was and still is owned by the Crown. The Crown would give out parcels of land to the 
subjects, a right which became known as an estate. The holder of land would be able to give it to 
others in exchange for services, thus creating the tiered system of ownership. 
5 Following the years of the litigation process and the highly-publicised decision in JA Pye (Oxford) v 
Graham [2003] 1 AC 419.  
6 Gray, K., Gray S., Elements of Land Law, 5th edition (Oxford University Press, 2009) p.1166. 
7 [2003] 1 AC 419. 
8 [2002] Ch. 676 at para.710. 
9 [2003] 1 AC 419 at para.2. 
10 Gray, K., Gray, S., Elements of Land Law, p.1166. 
11 Dixon, M., ‘The reform of property law and the Land Registration Act 2002: a risk assessment’ 
(2003), Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, at pp.151-152. 
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Certainty over ownership and title is an important land law consideration. The concept of 
limitation is therefore crucial; otherwise there would be indefinite conflict and constant 
vulnerability to better claims to title. Adverse possession, in this regard, acts as a check upon 
the ‘crippling social and legal costs which would otherwise be incurred in endless litigation 
over matters of title.’12 It is in the public interest to have a known limit to litigation and that 
actions are pursued within a reasonable period.13 This evolved from a deep-seated instinct for 
the preservation of security in the enjoyment of land, something reflected in the Land Registry 
being the ultimate source of information about title and ownership.14 Certainty of title is viewed 
as a social need. Significant burdens would otherwise be imposed on land, with each 
disposition jeopardised by the encroachment of ancient or increasingly stale claims.15 Long 
unchallenged occupation of land should not be disturbed, as otherwise undesirable 
uncertainty remains. In this context, adverse possession is a compromise between 
considerations of moral rights and social utility. Although regarded as land-theft, there has 
always been merit in ensuring that land titles ultimately ‘conform to lived boundaries.’16 
 
Realism of title is another factor. The historic approach to estate ownership was not through 
pieces of paper, but sustained possessory control. It served as the strongest evidence of 
ownership and functioned not only as the authentic origin to title, but also to guarantee 
enjoyment of land. It provided security in possession, ease of letting and facility in conveying 
property.17 To the English conveyancer, title previously merely constituted evidence of 
possessory rights.18 In registered land, title now vests the right itself, though not absolute, as 
there exist informal dispositions intended to be effective and acted on, but that are not reflected 
on the register. Evidently, these interests have deviated from the original structure, displaced 
by the modern view of property as an exclusive product of a system of computerised 
entitlement.19  
 
Adverse possession somewhat rests on the notion that loss should be imposed on the one 
‘who will suffer the least, the person whose roots are less vitally embedded in the land’.20 This 
                                                          
12 Gray and Gray , Elements of Land Law, at p.1163. 
13 Jourdan, S., Radley-Gardner, O., Adverse Possession, 2nd edition (Bloomsbury Professional, 2011) 
p.47. 
14 Cobb, N., Fox, L., ‘Living outside the system? The (im)morality of urban squatting after the Land 
Registration Act 2002’, (2007), Legal Studies, vol.27, p.238. 
15 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.1163.  
16Ibid, p.1164. 
17 Jourdan, Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession p.51.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Dixon, ‘The reform of property law’ p.150. 
20 Stake, J., ‘The uneasy case for adverse possession’, (2001), Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law, vol.89, p.2420. 
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is supported by the personhood theory,21 a psychological consideration developed by 
Margaret Radin, which provides that objects are closely bound to people and their existence 
and thus form a part of the way in which they constitute themselves as continuing personal 
entities.22 This theory has some flaws, in that it is difficult to say which party is more ‘vitally 
embedded’. The fact that one is out of possession does not mean that he does not consider 
the land a part of the way in which he constitutes himself. It could very well be the true owner 
who is more attached to the land, as it is, after all, his land. This would appear to be the case 
even if the true owner acquired the land through adverse possession in the first place. 
Although adverse possession does sometimes operate unfairly, a title acquired through the 
doctrine is as good as a title acquired by will or purchase. 
 
Social and economic considerations form additional argument. For instance, adverse 
possession reflects the policy that those who go to sleep on their rights should not receive 
judicial assistance.23 However, landowners are not always aware of the adverse possession 
of their land. Public bodies in particular often have more land than they can effectively police. 
This supports the doctrine somewhat, as allowing the land to fall into private hands could 
ensure that the land is utilised and policed more efficiently. This is not always a solution and 
it could be argued that what is actually needed is more protection and certainty for the true 
owner. Furthermore, even if aware of the possession, owners may not wish to commence 
hostile litigation (or may be unable to), making deprivation of title simply because of delay in 
reclaiming possession disproportionate.24 
 
Adverse possession can be described as ‘rewarding, on the expense of the sluggard, the 
purposeful labourer who makes constructive use of the land’.25 This idea is supported by the 
labour-desert theory developed by John Locke, which suggests those who make use of the 
land are ultimately entitled to it.26 There is strong encouragement of utility in land law and that 
land should be kept in commerce27, regardless of whether those actions are undertaken by 
the rightful owner.28 Strongly linked to this is utilitarianism, which provides that the best action 
is that which maximises utility.29 In adverse possession, the squatter is therefore the more 
                                                          
21 Radin, M., ‘Property and Personhood’, (1982), Stanford Law Review, vol.34, p.957. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.1164. 
24 Jourdan and Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, p.49. 
25 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.1164. 
26 Locke, J., Two Treaties of Government (London, 1690). 
27 Jourdan and Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, p.50. 
28 Ibid, p.49. 
29 Troyer, J., The Classic Utilitarians, Bentham and Mill, (Hackett Publishing, 2003) p.115. 
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welcome party, as he ensures that the land remains marketable, potentially by increasing its 
value.  
The Pye litigation shows that future use is not relevant to claims of adverse possession. 
However, if the Lockean perspective is taken to be true, then future use is as important as 
current use. This is simply because future use goes against what is often referred to as ‘quasi-
abandonment’ of the land by the true owner.30 A further consideration of this perspective rests 
in the reality of squatting: that most will not make improvements. Commonly, the lack of 
prospect of acquiring title coupled with fear of eviction remove incentive to improve or maintain 
property. Some cases demonstrate that squatters not only make an effective use of the land, 
but also carry out extensive improvements, such as in Pye and Best.31 However, a recent Irish 
case, Dooley v Flaherty,32 showcases the exact opposite; the defendant lived in a house of 
such disrepair that the new owners were shocked to find someone actually residing there. 
Improvement or maintenance of the land might draw attention to the squatting, which can 
accelerate removal of the squatter, a prospect which is highly undesirable for the squatter. 
This is completely understandable, as the longer the squatter stays in possession, the more 
likely that his claim will succeed. However, it somewhat conflicts with the requirement that it 
must be open and unconcealed.33 
 
A more modern theory compares adverse possession to a bloodless coup d’état, where both 
are immunized from the liability for the initial invasion of another’s land because both solve 
important moral problems. Adverse possession solves the problem of agendaless objects, just 
as the recognition of existing government solves the problem of stateless people.34 Here, 
adverse possession does not merely circumvent the authority of the original owner, but 
displaces it by asserting its own claim.35 Such moral arguments have become increasingly 
important in recent years because they counter moral arguments against it, mainly that 
squatters act immorally by trespassing. It is difficult to argue against this, as trespass is a well-
established civil wrong. It is therefore understandable why most cannot comprehend how an 
act which is throughout its duration consistently against the law can flourish into undisputable 
title to property. 
 
                                                          
30 Cobb and Fox, ‘Living outside the system?’ p.250. 
31 R (on the application of Best) v Chief Land Registrar [2016] QB 23. 
32 Dooley v Flaherty [2014] IEHC 528. 
33 Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App. Cas 273, at 291, 296. 
34 Katz, L., ‘The moral paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law’, 
(2010), McGill Law Journal, vol.55, pp.51 and 72. 
35 Ibid, p.73. 
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A final moral argument is the theory that there is a kind of hierarchy of users when it comes to 
the benefit derived from land. Under this concept, adverse possession works because it 
ultimately confers land onto the ‘highest-value user.’36 This somewhat represents a clash of 
two important concepts – the need for land to be utilised and marketable, and the importance 
of certainty in the enjoyment of land. A landowner can do anything on his land, even if that 
includes doing nothing, which is a freedom inherent in proprietary ownership. That right is 
undermined by the fact that somebody else might derive a higher benefit from the land and is 
undermined by adverse possession altogether. As a result, it is not clear how those 
considerations are balanced, which is highly unsatisfactory. 
 
The historical approaches to adverse possession are straightforward and well-constructed. 
However, they do not apply to the modern system, where acquisition of title through adverse 
possession is essentially incompatible with title-registration.37 It is increasingly strange that 
adverse possession should have ‘any relevance in a regime where registration is supposed to 
provide an accurate and definitive record of ownership’,38 although to an extent the already 
mentioned informal dispositions of land undermine this point of view. Current hostility and 
criticism towards the doctrine gives merit to restricting its operation to only those instances 
under Schedule 6, paragraph 5, LRA 2002. Although those apply to registered land, it does 
make sense to adopt them in unregistered land as well, as they bring a just outcome. Arguably, 
with adverse possession viewed as an immoral act of trespass at best, it would benefit from 
being associated with justice. It would be in the public interest to transform the doctrine into a 
principle that would be perceived as valid by everybody. As to ‘ownerless’ unregistered land, 
it is questionable where the immorality is in utilising unused land, especially where it is 
impossible to identify the owner. Unsurprisingly, most would advocate the point that adverse 
possession is not the right method to use, as less controversial acquisition methods exist. 
 
2 Adverse Possession in England and Wales 
Adverse possession in England and Wales differs procedurally if the land is unregistered or 
registered. However, possession requirements (factual possession and the intention to 
possess) apply equally to both types of land. Each of the elements will be considered in turn, 
starting with the procedural rules. 
                                                          
36 Fennell, L., ‘Efficient trespass: the case for ‘bad faith’ adverse possession’, (2006), Northwest 
University Law Review, vol.100, p.1081. 
37 Cobb and Fox, ‘Living outside the system?’, p. 249. 
38 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.1166. 
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Unregistered Land: 
In unregistered land, no action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the 
expiration of 12 years from the date which the right of action accrued to him.39 This limitation 
can be prolonged by the disability (including infancy) of the paper owner.40 The limitation 
period is extended for recovery actions for the Crown and the Church of England: 30 years for 
natural land41 and 60 years for the foreshore.42 The land concerned must be in possession of 
some natural or legal person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.43 An act of 
adverse possession by another party is required to trigger the limitation period, as mere non-
use of land cannot. Once the statutory period expires, a dispossessed owner’s title to his 
unregistered estate is immediately extinguished.44 The common law freehold which is held by 
the adverse possessor is subsequently unchallengeable. The land is still subject to all valid 
legal and equitable rights which pre-existed the possession, as only the paper-title is 
extinguished, not third-party interests which were already attached to the land. Some suggest 
that it is for this reason that public rights of way are, as a matter of law, immune from the 
principle of adverse possession.45 The statutory period of 12 years can be accumulated by the 
aggregate possession of a series of squatters.46 This possession must be strictly continuous,47 
so if squatter A abandons possession and, after some interval, squatter B begins his 
possession, he cannot assume the possession already established by squatter A. In those 
circumstances, the limitation period must start afresh.48 
 
Registered Land: 
The LA 1980 is expressly disapplied by the provision that no period of limitation can run against 
any person, other than a chargee, in relation to an estate in land, title to which is registered.49 
The squatter may remain in possession for decades, but this cannot extinguish the registered 
proprietor’s title.50 This reflects the importance of title in modern land law, as well as that the 
registration of a person as a proprietor under the LRA 2002 is ‘the closest thing in over 900 
years to absolute ownership of land.’51 
                                                          
39 Limitation Act 1980, s.15(1). 
40 LA 1980, s.28(1) and 32(2). 
41 LA 1980, schedule 1, Part II, para.10. 
42 LA 1980, schedule 1, Part II, para.11. 
43 LA 1980, schedule 1, para.8(1). 
44 LA 1980, s.17. 
45 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, pp.1159-1160. 
46 LA 1980, s.15(1), but also Allen v Matthews [2007] 2 P&CR 441 at 85. 
47 Shaw v Garbutt (1996) 7 BPR 14816 at 14824. 
48 LA 1980, schedule 1, para.8(2). 
49 Land Registration Act 2002, s.96(1), disapplying LA 1980, s.15.  
50 LRA 2002, s.96(3), disapplying LA 1980, s.17. 
51 Dixon, M., Modern Land Law, 10th Edition (Routledge, 2016), p 455. 
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The squatter must file an application with the Land Registry52 to be registered as proprietor, 
after a period of 10 years that immediately precedes the date of the application.53 The Registry 
is then required to notify the current registered proprietor that an application against his estate 
has been made,54 to which he is entitled to object, as long as the grounds for doing so are 
clearly communicated.55 Procedurally, if no agreement can be reached by the parties, the 
matter is referred by the Adjudicator to the Land Registry.56 Parties notified of the application 
against the estate can serve a counternotice on the Registry requiring the application to be 
disposed of.57 Counternotices must be served within 65 days,58 otherwise the applicant is 
statutorily entitled to be entered as the new proprietor.59 This is unlikely, as almost all object 
to such applications in practice. If the squatter remains in possession for a period of two years 
after the rejection, he is entitled to reapply for registration,60 and to be then registered as 
proprietor, irrespective of any further objections.61 Therefore, the true owner has only one 
chance to remove the squatter from their land and the law will not assist any further if he fails 
to do so. 
 
Procedurally, there can exist another step. Immediately after the counternotice is served, the 
Land Registry must reject the squatter’s application, unless he can prove one of the three 
exceptions to the right to object. The first exception is ‘equity by estoppel’, which applies where 
it would be unconscionable to dispossess the squatter.62 The circumstance must be such ‘that 
the applicant ought to be registered as proprietor’ of the estate.63 The second exception is 
‘some other entitlement’ to be registered. This occurs, for example, when the applicant has 
been in possession for 10 years, but is entitled to the land anyway, under a will or intestacy; 
or, he has purchased the land and has assumed possession without taking a formal transfer 
– he is therefore entitled to the land as a beneficiary under a bare trust. The third exception is 
‘reasonable mistake as to boundary’ where mistaken land boundaries are assumed by 
neighbouring owners to be correct.64 In certain circumstances the squatter can take over the 
registered land bordering upon land which belongs to him already, the exact boundaries never 
                                                          
52 LRA 2002, s.96, schedule 6, para.1(1). 
53 Ibid. 
54 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.2(1). 
55 LRA 2002, s.73(1). 
56 LRA 2002, s.73(3). 
57 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para3(1). 
58 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.3(2). 
59 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.4. 
60 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.6(1). 
61 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.7. 
62 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(2)(a). 
63 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(2)(b). 
64 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(4)-(5). 
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having been properly fixed,65 which is common in practice due to limitations of traditional 
mapping techniques. The squatter must be in possession for the requisite period of 10 years, 
reasonably believe the land to be his own,66 and the estate in question must be registered for 
at least one year before the application is submitted.67 
Once the adverse possession is successful, rather than extinguishing the old title, the 
registration of the squatter as the new proprietor extinguishes and replaces the common law 
freehold acquired through initial possession.68 
 
Factual Possession: 
Factual possession is the physical element required to be demonstrated by the squatter. 
Widely recognised as a ‘complete and exclusive physical control’ over the land,69 it must be 
‘open, notorious and unconcealed,’70 so that the true owner would notice it upon a reasonably 
careful inspection of the land. This gives owners an opportunity to challenge the possession 
before it becomes a threat to title, although arguably certain owners would be unable to notice 
adverse possession, such as the sick or elderly, who do not have the facilities to effectively 
watch their land. Nevertheless, openness strengthens an adverse possession claim, whereas 
concealment works against it.71 No occupancy which is concurrent to that of the paper owner 
can support a claim of adverse possession.72 Possession can only count as adverse if during 
the relevant period, the paper owner had available to him, but did not use, an effective right of 
entry. For instance, the mere non-payment of rent under a lease does not render the tenant 
an adverse possessor. Adverse possession cannot be consensual, and so is never adverse if 
enjoyed under a lawful title,73 or by licence.74 If the scope of the licence is significantly 
exceeded, the fact that the initial entry was under permission will not prevent commencement 
of adverse possession.75 However, it has been suggested that a former licensee may lack the 
sufficient intention to possess during the immediate aftermath of the licence’s expiry, 
especially if he is in the process of negotiating a renewal.76 
                                                          
65 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(4)(a)-(b). 
66 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(4)(c) and (5). 
67 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(4)(d). 
68 LRA 2002, schedule 6, para.5(1). 
69 As per Slade J in Buckinghamshire Country Council v Moran [1990] Ch. 623 and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. 
70 Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App. Cas 273, at 291 and 296. 
71 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.180.  
72 Treloar v Nute [1976] 1 WLR 1295 at 1300. 
73 BCC v Moran, [1990] Ch. 623, at 636. 
74 JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham, [2003] 1 AC at 37.  
75 Ibid, at 59 
76 BCC v Moran [1990] Ch. 623, at 706. 
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Only signed, written acknowledgment of the owner’s title stops the period of possession at the 
date of that acknowledgment,77 unless it is expressly stated as ‘without prejudice,’78 in which 
case it cannot be treated as evidence. Any oral acknowledgment alone is insufficient, though 
it can assist to demonstrate a lack of the requisite intention.79 Arguably, that makes the owner’s 
position more difficult, because a squatter is very unlikely to write and sign something that 
acknowledges he is not in possession, as that destroys his claim altogether. 
There is some suggestion that adverse possession must be peaceful, or peaceable,80 in that 
the squatter cannot resort to unreasonable violence to keep himself in possession.81 The 
essence of adverse possession lies in the ability to make a possessory presence which is 
effective against the world, so the defence of boundaries (even aggressive) might strengthen 
the claim rather than weaken it.82 A final consideration is that as long as the squatter is in 
possession of an identifiable portion of land, it is irrelevant in practice that the owner has not 
been wholly dispossessed. However, sometimes only that portion will be awarded to the 
squatter, the latter remaining in the possession of the true owner.83 
 
Intention to Possess (Animus Possidendi): 
The intention to possess is the mental element required to be established by the squatter. It 
is ‘an intention, in one’s name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including 
the owner with the paper title’,84 as per Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Hutton in Pye. Initially, 
the squatter’s ability to exclude all persons from the land is limited: ‘the squatter will normally 
know that until the full time has run, the paper owner can recover the land from him.’85 
Importantly, there is no need to demonstrate the intention to own or acquire the land, but 
simply the intention to possess. It is somewhat unclear as to why the two do not go together 
in the modern setting, as the successful intention to possess (coupled with factual possession) 
vests on the squatter the right to own land. If intention to acquire an estate need not be 
demonstrated, then logically that should not be the result and another form of interest should 
be conferred instead. It is an example of preservation of the historical focus on possession, 
but it is questionable if such dated considerations should still dictate terms in modern law. 
One of the most prominent features of the English system is that there is no differentiation 
between innocent and wilful trespass.86 The reason why there is no requirement of ‘good faith’ 
                                                          
77 LA 1980, ss.29(1)-(2) and 30(1). 
78 Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Barrett [2006] 1 P&CR 132 at 75-80. 
79 JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham, [2003] 1 AC at 679. 
80 Browne v Perry [1991] 1 WLR 1297 at 1301. 
81 Shaw v Garbutt (1996) 7 BPR 14816, at 14816.  
82 Ibid, at 14831. 
83 Ibid. 
84 JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham [2003] 1 AC, at 43 and 77.  
85 Ibid, at 43. 
86 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. V Waterloo Real Estate Inc. [1999] 2 EGLR 85 at 87. 
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is because it would considerably limit the scope of the doctrine altogether.87 ‘Bad faith’ only 
becomes relevant in two instances: if the owner can establish that he was the victim of fraud 
perpetuated by the adverse possession or if he can prove that any fact relevant to his right of 
action was deliberately concealed from him.88 In those circumstances, the period of limitation 
will not start to run until the owner could have discovered the fraud or concealment,89 but in 
the absence of those, it is generally irrelevant that the owner is not aware of his 
dispossession.90 The squatter must demonstrate that he ‘not only had the requisite intention 
to possess, but made such intention clear to the world.’91 Where use of the land does not by 
itself show an intention to possess, it is necessary to collect evidence to demonstrate so 
instead.92 If the squatter’s actions are ‘open to more than one interpretation […] the courts will 
treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi.’93 In Powell v McFarlane itself 
the court declined to find the requisite intention for the claimant who began to graze his cow 
on another’s land at the age of 14. Slade J stated that the intention of someone so young was 
‘not necessarily referable’94 to any intention to dispossess and occupy the land ‘wholly as his 
own property.’ 95 
 
The doctrine of adverse possession faced a further potential limitation under the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which made squatting in a residential 
building a criminal offence.96 It is questionable whether the offence is necessary at all,97 but 
the legislation has been criticised mostly because it does not provide any guidance on how 
the offence interacts with adverse possession.98 The case of Best v Chief Registrar99 clarified 
this position, explaining that the enactment of section 144 did not mean to produce any 
collateral effect on adverse possession.100 The aim of the legislation was to provide a quick 
remedy for stubborn squatters, not to undermine established doctrines of law.101 The more 
                                                          
87 Admittedly, since most consider adverse possession unjust, limiting the scope could prove 
beneficial. 
88 (1999) 32 HLR 569. 
89 LA 1980, s.32(1). 
90 Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch. D. 537 at 540-541. 
91 Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P&CR 452 at 472. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, at 478. 
95 Ibid. 
96 LASPOA 2012, s.144. 
97 Dixon, M., ‘Criminal squatting and adverse possession: the best solution?’, (2014), Journal of 
Housing Law, vol.17, p.94. 
98 Ibid. 
99 [2016] QB 23. 
100 Ibid, at para.50. 
101 Dixon, ‘Criminal squatting’, at p.9.7 
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widely applicable concept which came out of Best is that ex turpi causa102 depends entirely on 
circumstances, which appears to undermine this particular legal doctrine, even though the 
purpose of the decision was supposedly to clarify the law, not undermine another aspect of it. 
Additionally, the policy value of accepting some claims of adverse possession is recognised103 
by the case, no doubt because the claimant made substantial improvements to the rundown 
dwelling he took possession of. It is difficult to predict if the decision would have been similar 
if he had not. 
 
3 Positive Prescription in Scotland 
Adverse possession does not exist in Scotland, but a similar result is achieved by the Scots 
law doctrine of positive prescription. Positive prescription is the acquisition of rights by the 
passage of time, which is currently only possible for land.104 There are two requirements for 
the acquisition of land by positive prescription: title and possession. 
Title: 
Positive prescription cannot apply unless there is first either a deed recorded in the Register 
of Sasines105 or a title registered in the Land Register.106 Both are often referred to as the 
‘foundation writ’, as the doctrine must have a physical basis in a deed or title. This is the major 
difference, aside from the application, between the doctrines, as adverse possession does not 
require any proof of deed or title at all. Positive prescription cannot apply without a foundation 
writ, so even if one possesses a piece of land for decades, he or she can never become the 
owner. The Scots conveyancing system highly values the principle that land ownership should 
be determinable by simply consulting public registers.107 Consequently, while it cannot be 
guaranteed that every title on the registers is valid, at minimum it is certain that anyone who 
has not recorded a deed or registered a title is not the owner. This is a clear parallel to 
registered land in England and Wales, where the need for the Land Registry to be the ultimate 
source of information on title and ownership has become a priority.108 This need for public 
registers to be the ultimate source seems to be more pronounced in Scotland, because 
positive prescription is fundamentally rooted in the notion that one cannot possess without 
prior title.  
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Prescription can proceed on a disposition granted by a non-owner (a non domino disposition), 
but strict requirements must be met before the Keeper may accept it. These requirements109 
are as follows: firstly, the land in question must have already been possessed for one year by 
either the applicant, the grantor of the disposition on which the application is based, or both; 
secondly, the applicant must notify the owner, or the Crown, if no owner can be found. The 
person registered under this procedure is referred to as the ‘prescriptive claimant’110 and his 
entry is provisional until prescription is completed.111  The scope of positive prescription is 
reduced for titles registered in the Land Register, as they are map-based and therefore more 
definitive,112 whereas deeds recorded in the Register of Sasines are mostly products of 
traditional mapping techniques subject to limitations such as imprecise boundary lines. The 
foundation writ must contain a description of the land, or at least a description ‘habile to include 
that land’,113 though those can be sometimes of very poor quality. For example, in Suttie v 
Baird,114 the description and boundary measurements of the property were unclear, and the 
shape of the plot was different from that in the deed. However, as long as the description is at 
all capable of being read in a manner consistent with the possession that has been 
undertaken, that will suffice.115 The process is not concerned with whether or not the grantor 
intended to include it in the deed, because the intentions of the parties are irrelevant.116 Deeds 
recorded on the Register of Sasines cannot be ex facie invalid,117 as otherwise they will not 
be a good foundation writ.118 One could not acquire ownership, regardless of the length of 
possession.119 A deed will sometimes be invalid when someone tries to impersonate the 
documented owner. Usually however, invalidity comes from failure to fulfil the requirements of 
the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, or from the disponer granting a disposition 
in his favour.120 
 
Where the deed is recorded in the Register of Sasines, prescription will also not run if the deed 
is forged. Regarding the Land Register, forgery is only an obstacle if the grantee was aware 
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of it at the time of registration.121 The narrow definition of ‘forgery’ means that signing one’s 
name when one is not the owner is not forgery. However, signing somebody else’s name as 
though one is that person is.122 
 
Possession: 
Possession must be open, peaceable, without judicial interruption, continuous and for the 
prescriptive period of 10 years.123 The openness requirement exists for notification purposes. 
The owner does not need to know what is actually happening, as the test is objective, requiring 
only that the possession not be ‘clandestine’.124 As in England and Wales, secrecy works 
against the possession. The acts of possession must be sufficiently open in that the owner 
ought to be able to notice them. For example, in Stevenson-Hamilton’s Executors v McStay 
(No.2),125 acts of possession were minor (cutting grass, trimming hedges) and the court held 
that possession failed because a reasonably observant owner would not be aware that 
someone was trying to occupy his land.126 The requirement that possession must be 
peaceable differs to England and Wales, where aggressive defence of boundaries is 
sometimes reasonable. In Scotland, this requirement is enshrined in statute meaning 
possession which is open, but maintained forcibly, will not count towards the prescriptive 
period.127 Judicial interruption is defined in the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 
as ‘the making, in appropriate proceedings […] of a claim which challenges the possession in 
question.’128 This includes any claim made in arbitration.129 Such claims need not be 
successful; if the person making the claim has sufficient interest to do so, the period of 
prescription will be interrupted and will have to begin afresh. Continuous possession does not 
mean that the possessor must always be present and exercising possession. However, the 
gaps cannot be excessive and the possession must not be interrupted. In Stevenson-Hamilton 
possession failed because the owners themselves carried out possessory acts, such as site 
excavation. Positive prescription is completed after the required period of 10 years, following 
the recording of a deed or the registering of a title.130 The extended period of 20 years applies 
to servitudes131 (such as easements), and Crown-owned land.132  
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Until the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) 1874 Act, persons with disabilities enjoyed 
extended time, but the 1973 Act makes no such allowances, assuming disabled persons will 
have a guardian (either de facto or de jure) who will be vigilant in preventing dispossession.133 
This starkly contrasts the English rules, and appears naïve in assuming that almost all disabled 
persons have a guardian. This situation could be exploited, even by the guardian, who could 
be looking after the interests of the person in possession and not the interests of the owner. 
As with English law, possession need not be exercised by the same person for the whole 
period. What is required is possession by the grantee of the foundation writ, or by that person 
and his successors.134 Additionally, possession need not be personal and can be exercised 
by anyone with the authorisation or consent to do so from the actual possessor.135 
 
Under positive prescription, possession requires some degree of physical control. It has been 
said that the physical requirement for possession is ‘possession of the character of which the 
thing is capable,’136 so each case depends on its own circumstances.137 Where a property is 
in a condition allowing very little active use, fairly minimal acts may be sufficient.138 Generally, 
possessing a part will not lead to ownership of the whole, if possession of the remainder is 
retained by another, with possession normally only being acquired for the part taken.139 The 
extent of possession is judged by boundary features, such as walls/fences, or natural features 
such as rivers. Anything falling outside of those boundaries is not normally possessed.140 
Where adjoining properties are both described in a way which could include the disputed area, 
the preferred claim will prevail. For example, in Bain, the pursuer used the ground for rough 
shooting for more than 10 years, believing the land to be his. The defenders could establish 
no use and so the court awarded ownership to the pursuer. The possession must be 
possession as if by the owner.141 Where possession has been taken on the basis of one right, 
the possessor cannot switch the basis of that possession to prejudice the grantor. Houstoun 
v Barr142 illustrates that prescription may not run if the acts carried out do not ‘clearly and 
unequivocally refer to the title of ownership.’143 Here, a cottage owner claimed to have 
acquired ownership of an adjacent strip of land, but also used it for access to a leased field. 
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The court concluded that possession of the strip could equally well be attributed to the lease 
as to the ownership of title to his house. Similarly, in Duke of Argyll v Campbell,144 the court 
declined to recognise the possession as sufficient, because the pursuer occupied one of the 
defenders’ properties as a keeper and so could not demonstrate the requisite possession as 
an owner. As with adverse possession, good faith plays no prominent part in positive 
prescription. However, situations exist in which bad faith becomes relevant such as title 
acquisition. Acquirers are entitled to rely on the title sheet as it stands on the date of acquisition 
unencumbered by any right which has been omitted. Encumbrances wrongly omitted from the 
title sheet extinguish when the property is acquired by a party which is, in good faith, unaware 
of their existence.145  
 
When compared to adverse possession in England and Wales, positive prescription appears 
to offer the true owner more protection. Adverse possession can be interpreted as prejudicial 
to the true owner, especially in the context of unregistered land, where no notice is required. 
The Scottish rules require notice to be given from the beginning, so that all parties are aware 
of the situation. Positive prescription applies equally whether the deed is recorded or the title 
is registered146, which makes the application of the rules more comprehensible. In 
unregistered land, adverse possession appears more advantageous to the squatter, whereas 
in registered land, the advantage is clearly with the owner. The result is that in both 
circumstances the parties are on unequal footing. Positive prescription mitigates that by 
requiring both title and possession from the start, so the parties are always on equal footing. 
In the context of positive prescription, the party which is ultimately successful in its claim is 
often that which makes better use of the land. As already discussed, ensuring that the land is 
kept marketable and in use is one of the fundamental underpinnings of adverse possession, 
yet it is positive prescription that appears to embody that far more successfully. That 
notwithstanding, positive prescription no longer makes allowances for disabled persons. 
Although it puts both prospective parties in a dispute on equal footing by requiring both title 
and possession, it fails to treat each and every pursuer or defender equally. This seems 
especially strange in the context of persons who do not have a guardian. Most probably will, 
but the reality is that some will not, because they cannot afford one, or are not disabled enough 
to be allowed one and so are left in a more disadvantageous situation by the law. This is 
interesting from the perspective of a potential human rights challenge. Some commentaries 
suggest that the doctrine is safe in this regard, as the dispossessed owner can dispute the 
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application of prescription in the courts, but also because the foundation writs are always 
available for public viewing, which lessens the burden on the original owner.147 The fact that 
the doctrine does not offer more adequate safeguards for vulnerable landowners introduces 
doubt into the notion that it would be completely ‘safe’. Arguably, those persons are still more 
protected than disabled owners of unregistered land in England and Wales. Although positive 
prescription is a more balanced process than adverse possession, it has been argued that its 
origin in Scotland was little more than a pretext for a ‘land grab’ of the rich and powerful 
landowners,148 so even if balanced now, the foundations appear to have been introduced in 
order to legitimise appropriation of land never granted to the owner in the first place. 
Consequently, both doctrines have major flaws. 
 
4 Adverse Possession in the Republic of Ireland 
Adverse possession in the Republic of Ireland has the same foundation as adverse 
possession in England and Wales, as both originated in the feudal system. Although the basis 
is almost identical, the development has been different in some respects. 
 
Limitation Period: 
The Statute of Limitations 1957 applies equally to unregistered and registered land,149 and 
there are no procedural differences in the application of the limitation period. Notwithstanding 
the status of the land, the limitation period is 12 years,150 with extended periods for the State: 
30 years for natural land151 and 60 years for the foreshore.152 Where the right of action has 
been concealed by the defendant’s fraud or that of his agent, time will not run until the owner 
discovers it.153 Mistake is treated similarly, but applies only where the basis of the action is 
relief from its consequences.154 Time will not run until the plaintiff discovers the mistake. It is 
unclear if the section applies to all mistakes, or only those for which the dispossessor bears 
greater responsibility than the dispossessed owner.155 An innocent mistake, such as where 
the true boundary lies, will not prevent time from running.156 
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Where the dispossessed owner is under a ‘disability’, such as being a minor,157 or of unsound 
mind,158 the action may be brought within six years from the date when the owner ceases to 
be under the disability or dies, whichever occurs first. This is regardless of whether the normal 
period has expired.159 As in England and Wales, sometimes time will begin afresh. 
Acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s title destroys any possessory title acquired by the squatter. 
Time starts again from the date of the written and signed acknowledgment.160 Part-payment 
of debt secured on land may also cause time to restart, such as in the context of a mortgagee 
who has acquired a right to enforce the security under the mortgage against the mortgagor. 
When the mortgagor pays part of the secured debt, time will run afresh.161 
Some procedural rules apply only to registered land. The Registration of Title Act 1964 
provides that where any person claims to have acquired (by possession) title to registered 
land, he may apply to the registrar to be registered as the owner.162 The registrar, if satisfied 
of the acquisition, may register him as owner. Upon such registration, the title of the true owner 
shall be extinguished.163 Interestingly, the Act provides that while time is running against a 
registered owner, the adverse possessor has an overriding interest in the land.164 This includes 
acquired rights, or those in the process of being acquired under the SL 1957.165 This offers no 
protection to the adverse possessor against the registered owner or an assignee, but it 
indicates that he has the right to evict those attempting future possession.166 
 
Elements of Possession: 
The plaintiff must be someone in whose favour the period of limitation can run.167 Successive 
adverse possession is possible in Ireland, although on more restrictive terms than in England 
and Wales. The successive possessor can borrow time accumulated by the original possessor 
if the land is passed onto him by an inter vivos conveyance, will or intestacy. If that period 
adds up to 12 years, the true owner’s title will be barred.168 If the original possession is 
abandoned, a successor cannot adopt that period, even if he takes over immediately.169 
Similarly to England and Wales, what constitutes adequate possession depends on 
circumstances. Legal possession rests on real de facto possession constituted by the 
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occupier’s general power and intent to exclude unauthorised interference,170 as well as that 
possession, prima facie, is a title good against everyone who cannot prove a better one.171 
There must be either discontinuance of possession by the owner, or his dispossession. 
Accordingly, rights of action shall accrue on the date of dispossession or discontinuance,172 
with no knowledge of dispossession required.173 Discontinuance of possession is impossible 
if the disputed land is incapable of use or enjoyment.174 For example, in Dundalk Urban District 
Council v Conway,175 a small, steep plot of wasteland beside a river was incapable of actual 
use or enjoyment. Discontinuance of possession is often synonymous with property 
abandonment, so mere non-use will not necessarily suffice. Even smallest acts of the owner 
will be enough to disprove intention to discontinue possession. 176  
 
In this context, the owner’s intended future use is an interesting feature. In England and Wales, 
since Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran177 the intention of the owner is irrelevant. In 
Ireland, the situation is unclear. There is a notion, although not completely endorsed due to 
questionable clarity, that the Leigh v Jack178 rule applies. It provides that the owner’s future 
plans may prevent him from dispossession if the squatter’s current use is consistent with those 
future plans. This indicates that the owner’s intention is relevant, at least if known to the 
squatter.179 The position on this matter is constantly undermined by consistent judicial criticism 
and inconsistent judicial application. The rule was most recently endorsed in Dundalk (1987), 
where the squatter could not establish discontinuance as he utilised the land in a way 
consistent with envisaged use. The most recent case undermining the endorsement was 
Feehan v Leamy180 (2001), where approval of the approach in Buckinghamshire was shown, 
though some interpret it as supporting the rule in Leigh v Jack instead. Without a Supreme 
Court decision to make the position certain, the rule appears to be reluctantly retained. 
Dispossession overlaps with discontinuance of possession, but focuses on the squatter’s 
actions. Dispossession acts must be inconsistent with the true owner’s enjoyment of land and 
his intended use of it.181 The land’s character, nature of acts done, and squatter’s intention are 
relevant.182 For example, to adversely possess a road reserved to the grantor of a lease, it is 
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not necessary to make it impossible to walk or move along it. A fence with a stile for 
pedestrians would be sufficient.183 
 
It is interesting how minimal acts of the owner are treated in the context of dispossession. In 
the past, mere entry onto disputed land would not prevent a squatter in effective control from 
being in possession, unless the owner took back actual possession.184 Randall v Stevens185 
illustrates this: the defendant entered a cottage the plaintiffs were adversely possessing, 
removing them and most of their possessions. This constituted taking back possession, even 
though the plaintiffs returned and continued possession on the same day. More recently, 
Dooley v Flaherty,186 questioned whether minimal acts of the owner (sending in builders 
through the neighbour’s attic and keeping the property insured) were enough to put a 
discontinuation to the squatter’s possession. It was held that the slightest acts done by, or on 
behalf of, the owner would be sufficient and so the owner was not dispossessed. Academics 
have criticised this decision based on the facts, which were that after a lease for the property 
held by the plaintiff’s father expired, both remained in possession, with the plaintiff continuing 
to after his father’s death. One commentator disagreed with the reasoning, suggesting minimal 
acts should show that the owner never lost possession, but here the squatter already had 
possession by virtue of the tenancy.187 It is therefore problematic to assume the true owner 
was not dispossessed because he was not in possession immediately before the 
commencement of the limitation period.188  The final and most important element of 
possession is intention, or animus possidendi, which constitutes strongest evidence of 
dispossession. Mistaken belief that land is the squatter’s own can extinguish the title of the 
owner,189 so one need not be aware that he is adversely possessing. Discontinuation of 
possession is treated as abandonment of property, so the intention to possess is less vital to 
prove. This appears to be the case because the owner has no future use for the property. 
 
The doctrine in Ireland seems to provide more security for the true owner when compared to 
unregistered land in England and Wales. Precedent suggests that it is much easier for the 
owner to demonstrate that the squatter has not actually adversely possessed his land. Most 
prominently, the squatter’s use must be entirely inconsistent with the true owner’s use. In 
England and Wales, the use could be identical and yet if the squatter has actual possession 
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and the requisite intention, he will succeed. Minimal acts of the owner are the most striking 
contrast between the doctrines. Although subject to some criticism, Dooley is good law, further 
supporting the idea of the Irish owner being more protected, at least in the context of 
unregistered land where even sending in builders to carry out minor work is sufficient. 
Regarding registered land, English landowners are far more protected. No adverse possessor 
(save for the mistaken neighbour) can acquire title to registered land without alerting the real 
owner and jeopardising their position. Irish adverse possession applies equally to registered 
and unregistered land. Although less convoluted, the overall level of protection is less 
adequate than in England and Wales. However, there exist commentaries demonstrating that 
the Irish land owner is not actually less easily dispossessed in practice.190 Although the future 
use rule has faced criticism and several proposals to change the law,191 it still applies. This 
generates even more protection for the true owner by considering what he intends to do with 
his property. Some commentators argue that the rule in Leigh v Jack is retained because of 
the decision in JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham,192 as it raised doubts over fairness of the doctrine 
from the owner’s perspective.193 But in Perry v Woodfarm Homes Ltd194 the Irish courts 
departed from the English approach195 long before the Court of Appeal rejected the rule.196 
This is because Irish property (particularly rural property) is often transmitted between 
generations via the Statute of Limitation, rather than formal representation processes.197 This 
different factual background has been suggested as the reason why the Irish courts favour the 
‘implied licence theory’ which forms the rule in Leigh v Jack198 and why there is reluctance to 
follow the English direction. The retention of the rule can be interpreted as an attempt to ensure 
that, if challenged, Irish adverse possession would not violate human rights, a response no 
doubt triggered by the JA Pye (Oxford) v UK199 litigation. Although there is reluctance to say 
so outright, a view exists that if Pye had been heard in Ireland, the Grahams would not have 
succeeded.200 This is precisely because Leigh v Jack applies, as well as that minimal acts of 
the owner demonstrate lack of dispossession. 
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Conclusion 
In terms of the adequacy of each system, any evaluation must consider current land law 
priorities. Historically, pragmatists viewed possessory control as strongest ownership 
evidence201, something clearly derived from feudal origins. In that context, adverse possession 
was absolutely adequate and the retention of the unchanged doctrine is completely 
understandable, as it provided a suitable method of ownership attainment. The introduction of 
title registration caused a shift from the original position. Possession is no longer the strongest 
evidence; title is now the most important component, as it awards the right itself. This is 
because the modern view is that property is the product of a computerised system of 
entitlement, with the Land Registry as the ultimate information source.202 Therefore, a doctrine 
based solely on possession cannot be an appropriate solution. 
 
Considering current priorities, the way in which adverse possession operates in England and 
Wales appears most adequate. Ownership comes from the title itself and, if registered, there 
can be virtually no better claim to that particular piece of land. However, the doctrine is almost 
redundant in registered land, although it is difficult to decide if that is harmful in any real sense. 
Scottish positive prescription is also appropriate. The historical development of the doctrine 
shows that until the introduction of the Land Registration Acts, it was the most adequate 
system, due to the long utilisation of the Register of Sasines. A major flaw exists however, as 
ownership can be founded on invalid documentation.203 For the doctrine to operate fairly, 
safeguards allowing confirmation of foundation writ validity must be introduced, thereby 
reducing fraud and maintaining doctrinal integrity. Although the Irish system is reasonably 
well-balanced when it comes to the position of the parties, the doctrine is inadequate in light 
of modern land law priorities. It does not reflect title being the strongest ownership evidence, 
and despite the fact that the Registration of Title Act was introduced in 1964, possession 
retains prominence. 
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